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Psychologism and the Cognitive Foundations
of Mathematics
Christophe Heintz
Institut Jean Nicod
1 Introduction
In this paper, I will attempt to purport the two following claims:
Claim1: Naturalistic theories of the cognition of Mathematics im-
ply psychologism, unless one recognises the social nature of Math-
ematics.
Claim2: A non psychologistic enquiry into the cognitive founda-
tions of mathematics should aim at disentangling the social and the
cognitive causes at work in the making of mathematical knowledge.
My argument unfolds accordingly: In the ﬁrst part of the paper, I
analyse how an enquiry into the cognitive foundations of mathematics
can turn out psychologistic, i.e., assert that the truths of mathematics
and logic are psychological facts. I then attempt to show what philosoph-
ical presumptions on the nature of mathematics lead to psychologism. I
argue that the only way out of this a poria is to acknowledge that social
normativity is an essential constituent of mathematical practice. In the
last part, I brieﬂy sketch what could be a non-psychologistic enquiry
into the cognitive foundations of mathematics. I argue that such an
enquiry should include — apart from psychological studies — (1) an an-
thropological analysis of the role of psychological facts in mathematical
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practice and (2) a historical analysis of the cognitive constraints on the
development of mathematical knowledge. Along these lines, I support
the idea that Mathematics is at the same time a cognitive product and
a cultural object. Thus, the theoretical position I advocate is, using the
current labels, cognitivism plus sociologism; where cognitivism, for my
purpose, is a research program that led to assert that there are speciﬁc
competencies that underlay our knowledge of Mathematics and Logic,
and sociologism is the theoretical position that asserts that knowledge is
socially constituted and that leads to the study of the social texture of
knowledge, such as scientiﬁc institutions, processes of communication,
deference and, more importantly for my current concern, the normative
aspects of knowledge.
2 Psychologism is coming back!
Psychologism, in its crude form, is the doctrine that asserts that
“logic is a study of the mind” (Macnamara, 1986:10). This doctrine has
been fought against and was oﬃcially dismissed by the arguments of
Frege (1884, 1893 and 1894) and Husserl (1900). Their main argument
was that the truths of logic are objective and independent of psycholog-
ical empirical and subjective facts. Psychology deals with what people
believe to be true while logic deals with what is necessarily true. Since
Frege and Husserl the question seemed to be settled. I will argue, how-
ever, that psychologism is still a lively philosophical problem. To begin
with, one of the present-day avatars of psychologism is the use of logic
in psychology. Let us start with the work of cognitive science on rational
behaviour.
Cognitive science asserts that human behaviour stems from, and can
be accounted for by, cognitive processes. Applied to Mathematics, this
means that the production of proofs and mathematical concepts should
be explained in terms of cognitive processes. Moreover, one of the most
important paradigms in cognitive science asserts that cognitive events
are performances rendered possible thanks to some cognitive compe-
tences. This paradigm was ﬁrst initiated by Chomsky’s theory of linguis-
tic competence. The modular theory, ﬁrst enounced by Fodor, speciﬁes
the functioning of some cognitive competencies, which are described as
mental devices, or modules, which perform speciﬁc tasks. Modules are
cognitive organs; their function is to perform speciﬁed computations on
mental representations. Within this framework, it is natural and fruitful
to hypothesise the existence of cognitive competencies such as a ‘logic
module’ and/or an ‘arithmetical module’, which are mental devices that
produce/perform logic and/or arithmetic. Yet, once this assumption is
made, the threat of psychologism is not far. Here is the path that leads
to it:
(1) Producing Mathematics is using our cognitive mental de-
vices.
(2) Thus Mathematics is the product of mental devices.
(3) Mathematics depends on the mental, its truth and content
are psychological facts.
Let me illustrate my argument with an analysis of Macnamara’s re-
search program. Macnamara was a leader cognitive psychologist who
studied the cognitive foundations of reasoning while at the same time
being conscious about the problem of psychologism, so I think he is a
good representative of the theories that I intend to criticise. In “A Bor-
der dispute” (1986) Macnamara called for a research program based on
the idea that the mind contains some innate devices from which origi-
nate our reasoning and that that constitute our basic logical skills. The
goal of the program was therefore to discover those devices. He further-
more claimed that those devices essentially amount to some “basic logical
skills”. As a consequence, logic is the appropriate, and even essential,
mathematical tool for the psychology of reasoning. This call was taken
seriously, for in 1994, Macnamara edited, together with the G. Reyes,
a book called “The Logical Foundation of Cognition” containing articles
responding to Macnamara’s program with the logic of types. Our ba-
sic logical skills, according to Macnamara, constitute a “mental logic”,
which accounts for our linguistic resources of expression and understand-
ing and our ability to grasp inference. More generally, “The mind in part
of its functioning applies the principles of that [mental] logic”. The men-
tal logic is in correspondence with “each ideal logic (true to intuition)”
[Macnamara 1986, 22] and includes fundamental principles such as the
principle of contradiction. Logical competence is error free and “gives
rise to intuition of absolute necessity” [Macnamara 1986, 28]. It consti-
tutes a ‘competence’, as opposed to ‘performance’, following Chomsky’s
distinction in his theory of universal grammar. That is to say that the
mental logic, or logical competence, is not framing all our thoughts as in
a Kantian theory (sometimes called transcendental psychologism). The
mental logic constitutes an aptitude that we can, and must, call on in
order to perform good reasoning. The main purpose of this distinction
is to allow the possibility of logical errors in the performance of logical
tasks. In that way Macnamara wants to account for the intuitions that:
– The layman has the same ideals (in his behaviour) as logic (e.g.
consistency).
– The building of formal logic is based /founded on basic logical
intuitions.
– The learning of formal logic is necessarily based on basic logical
intuitions.
The logical competence “abstracts from logical error, from other psy-
chological functioning that accompanies logical thought, and from the
speciﬁcs of the many devices that could apply the competence” [Macna-
mara 1986, 27].
Macnamara defends his theory against the accusation of being psy-
chologistic. His claims, he says, “have to do with access to logical prin-
ciples, not with justifying them” (1986:42), the latter being the work of
logicians. But what does Macnamara mean by “access to logical princi-
ples”? It seems that mental logic is a kind of ladder which gives access
to the objective realm of logic. In that case the truth is already there;
mathematicians describe it and psychologists describe how and why the
description is possible. Macnamara, however, explains the human possi-
bility of doing logic with the basic principles of logic. When he considers
our access to logical connectors he merely asserts that logical connectors
are already in our minds. The use we make of connectors is the result
of the activation of our logical competence, the mental logic. Hence the
description of the access is a generation of the truths of logic plus the
assertion that this generation stems from psychological facts. The ladder
is exactly our making of logic. Still, Macnamara continues his defence
by softening the meaning of ‘access to logical principles’. Mental logic,
he says, does not generate logic; it only assesses its validity. So, let us
consider how the assessment procedure works. If the basic logical com-
petence is just the cause of our conviction, then the assertion is just that
we have a feeling of certainty because we have an innate feeling of cer-
tainty. This does not provide, as Macnamara claims, “the key element
in the psychology of human reasoning”. So the assessment procedure
includes some generative consequences, and in particular, the making of
logic. It is as if we produced some logical-like propositions, and only the
truly logical ones were passing the tests. So here again logic ﬁnds its
justiﬁcation in psychological facts, namely passing the assessment tests
of mental logic. Logic is in Macnamara’s theory, the very result of our
(ideal) performing of the logical competence. The truths and the laws of
logic can be reduced to laws of psychology because the formers are just
the expression of some characteristics of our mind. But such character-
isations of our mind are actually laws of psychology. In brief, to give a
mental reality to the laws of logic implies that the objectivity and the
normative character of logic stem from the laws of thought. Eventually,
a last argument of Macnamara consists in appealing to Platonism: the
semantics of mathematics stems from referring to the Platonistic world
of mathematical entities. Yet, the knowledge of mathematics is possible
through mental logic. Macnamara’s epistemology does not include an
account of how we refer to, or have any intuition of, Platonistic enti-
ties outside our minds. On the contrary, his cognitive account of logical
knowledge is wholly internalist. (The Platonistic School has, however,
provided an account of how reference to Platonist entities is possible. So
I will come back to it shortly.)
Macnamara’s theory is a moderate version of psychologism because
it asserts that logic expresses properties of the mind but not in the sense
of Mill that “logic is an introspective science generalising over inferences
that are judged necessary” [Macnamara 1986, 10]. Logic is not an em-
pirical science generalising over people’s reasoning. It is psychology that
must contain logic as an a priori science. Thus Macnamara avoids some
of the strong criticisms of Frege and Husserl against psychologism by
coming back to a theory that looks very much like Kant’s ‘transcendental
psychology’. Meanwhile, his competence/performance distinction allows
him to avoid the diﬃculties of a strict kantian theory with regard to
the possibility of logical error. Yet, Macnamara’s psychologism becomes
radical when we add, as Macnamara does, that the autonomy of logic
with regard to performance, far from bringing us afar from the laws of
psychology is precisely what allows us to really grasp the logical com-
petence, that is to say without the disturbance of the performance. In
this context, the role of the psychologists of reasoning is to ﬁnd a system
of logic that is appropriate to encompass both our day-to-day reason-
ing and mathematical logic; and the role of logicians is to develop that
system. With this share of the tasks that Macnamara seems to assume,
one cannot accuse him of saying that logic is a study of the mind. It
remains however that logic is expressing some laws of psychology. The
truths of logic are psychological facts. Macnamara deludes himself when
he thinks that (his) psychology can be neutral with regard to the ontol-
ogy of logic. Macnamara deﬁnes human rationality as essentially being
the product of innate logical abilities. In doing so, he reduces logic to
the expression of the functioning of human rationality, which in the last
analysis is pychologism.
Recently, other mathematical competencies have been posited by psy-
chologists. The cognitive foundations of arithmetic have in particular
been the object of interesting experiments and theories. Based on ani-
mals and pre-linguistic children ability to distinguish diﬀerent quantities,
psychologists have asserted the existence of a ‘real number system in the
brain’ [Dehaene 1996] [Gallistel & Gelman, 2000].
Of course, not every psychologist is convinced of the existence of
a logical module and other speciﬁc mathematical competencies (e.g.,
Johnson-Laird, see [Johnson-Laird & Byrne 1991]). My present con-
cern, however, bears not so much on the speciﬁc capacities psychologists
posit, than on the relation between these capacities and Mathematics.
As a matter of fact, I believe that these psychological investigations
and theories go in the right direction. Yet, for those theories not to
be disconﬁrmed by the arguments already raised by Frege and Husserl
against psychologism, the role of these capacities in the making of math-
ematics must be clariﬁed. While Dehaene’s assertions seems wise and
modest: he urges teachers of mathematics not to discard basic intuitions
in their teaching on the basis that such mathematical intuitions do exist
and should play a role when learning mathematics, others have made
stronger and rather bold assertions. Thus, the logician Krivine, sup-
ported by the philosopher J. Petitot, asserts in a popular French science
journal [Science et Vie February 2002], - the heading, for the occasion
‘Intelligence reveals its true nature’), that mathematical theorems are
nothing but discoveries on the functioning of our mind. Godel’s ﬁrst
incompleteness theorem, for example, would be the mathematical dis-
covery of our sleeping program. The psychologists Gallistel, Gelman
and Cordes have a somewhat similar view. In a paper whose title is
“The cultural and Evolutionary History of the Real Numbers” they say:
“Our thesis is that [the] cultural creation of the real number was a pla-
tonistic rediscovery of the underlying non-verbal system of arithmetic
reasoning. The cultural history of the real number concept is the his-
tory of our learning to talk coherently about a system of reasoning with
real numbers that predates our ability to talk, both phylogenetically
and ontogenetically”. Of course, if the paper successfully shows that
“there exists a common system for representing both countable and un-
countable quantity by means of mental magnitudes formally equivalent
to real numbers”, it actually says nothing about the cultural history or
how the ‘platonistic rediscovery’ happened. To ﬁnish with a philoso-
pher, Penelope Maddy asserts that we “possess intuitive, non-linguistic
knowledge of general facts about sets, and intuitive principles like the
simpler axioms and the iterative conception are justiﬁed by their ac-
curacy in formulating this intuitive knowledge” (1980: 189). In order
to save Godel’s Platonism from the epistemologist’s criticism Ű how do
we access the Platonic world of mathematical entities? -, she describes
mathematical intuition in terms of neurophysiological processes (1990).
Maddy, here, is very close to psychologistic theories. Yet, with Godel,
she asserts that Mathematical concepts do refer to things outside our
minds, which are (contrary to Godel and in accordance with Quine and
Putnam) in the physical world. This, if it was true, should save her from
psychologism. Unfortunately, as she acknowledges herself later (1996)
(The later ‘naturalist Maddy’ criticises the previous ‘realist Maddy’, in
this paper, I normally refer to the realist Maddy), this does not square
with the practice of mathematics: mathematicians do not intend to re-
fer to things in the physical world and, more importantly, they do not
call on how the world is to justify their claim. It is, however, another
assertion that actually makes Maddy’s account not psychologistic. She
says: “[mathematical] intuitions can be false, so no matter how obvious
they seem, they must be conﬁrmed like any theory, and like any theory,
they can be overthrown”. Intuitions do play a major role in mathemat-
ics, but they do not have the last word. This immunes Maddy’s theory
from the criticism against psychologism but let us with another prob-
lem: if mathematical intuitions are not suﬃcient for assessing the truth
of mathematics, what is?
3 Where is then the norm? Strategies for
avoiding psychologism
The kernel of the refutation of psychologism, I believe, relies on the
essentially normative component of mathematical practice: In mathe-
matics, we just cannot say whatever we want, even if it corresponds to
our individual strongest intuition. The problem with psychologism, is
that it cannot account for this fact. In the cognitivist setting, this means
that mathematical concepts or proof procedures cannot designate a class
of mental processes that would necessarily produce mathematical truths.
At most, cognitive processes sustain and allow deﬁnitions to have some
content and proof procedures to be applied. Mathematics is normative
and norms diﬀer from competence:
1. A standard of justiﬁcation is something external. It is not subjec-
tive.
2. Justiﬁcations are performance. It is these performances that are
the object of assessment (truth, coherence, . . . ), not the underlying
competence.
3. We cannot give an instance of the right cognitive ability which is
to be used when doing mathematics. But even if this was possible,
doing mathematics would not consist in categorising neurological
events.
On the other hand, we do want to give a role to mathematical in-
tuition. Mathematicians are cognitive systems; they use their minds
when doing mathematics. The appeal to basic mathematical intuitions
acknowledges this fact and points out the necessity to rely, in the last
instance, to irreducible basic cognitive processes. At some point, formal
justiﬁcation must end and give place to a mere feeling of certainty. Even
if the mathematician’s job is not to analyse or even talk about intuitions,
it remains that he uses these intuitions to do Mathematics.
There are various strategies for recognising the normative aspects
of mathematics, and thus avoiding psychologism, and at the same time
giving a proper role to cognitive processes. Contemporary Platonism,
Modesty and the cognitively informed Sociologism that I will advocate,
are such strategies. Formalism, however, is not, since it denies as much as
possible the role of intuitions. Intuitionism and logicism, or set-theorism,
acknowledge the role of only a restricted portion of the intuitions at work
in mathematical practice. So I remain with the task of showing that my
strategy is better than Platonism and Modesty.
Much of my criticism of Platonism has been mentioned already. It
merely consists in saying that Platonism does not allow to meet the
epistemological challenge. First, Quine-Putnam Platonism is indepen-
dent from epistemological concerns. Second, Godelian Platonism does
not provide a clear account of the intuitive contact between us and math-
ematical objects. Third, more recent attempts to give such an account
rely (as far as I know) on what Maddy (1989) calls compromise Platonism
and asserts that mathematical entities are in the world. But mathemati-
cal knowledge is not directly knowledge about the world, since the truth
of its propositions is not assessed on the ground of what the world is.
Macnamara’s and Maddy’s intuitions are mathematical intuitions, but
strangely enough, they are not intuitions of the Platonistic mathematical
realm.
Two alleged links between the worldly mathematical realm and math-
ematicians are put forward. First, Maddy provides an account on how
mathematicians refer to sets [Maddy 1980]. Along the line of the causal
theory of reference, she shows that we perceive sets and that this per-
ception is at the origin of our intuitive knowledge about sets. Maddy
forcefully describes a referential concept of set that is developed through
interactions with sets of real things. This referential concept, however,
remains a naïve concept. It is certainly the one we use in our day-to-
day reasoning about sets of things and that may be at the basis of our
naïve understanding of numbers. What seems doubtful, however, is that
set-theorists use the very same concept in their reasoning. In any case,
a mathematician is not allowed to prove a theorem by referring to in-
stantiated sets of real things. This, again, casts serious doubt on the
referential character of mathematical concepts. The naïve concept of
set does play a role in Mathematics, but it is not the one of allowing
mathematicians to refer to worldly things. Mathematical notions have
a referential character before (naïve theories) and after (applied mathe-
matics) Mathematics proper, but mathematical practice allows no such
reference. The second alleged link between the world and mathematical
knowledge calls on evolutionary theories. It is mentioned by both Maddy
and Macnamara. Innate mathematical concepts are the fruit of an evo-
lutionary adaptation of our cognitive apparatus to the world. These
concepts could not be misleading, or else they would not survive evolu-
tionary selection. Therefore they are concepts providing true intuitive
beliefs. The problem is that evolutionary selection does not guaranty
truth. As Maddy acknowledges herself, intuitive beliefs may be false.
Suppose, however, that mathematical intuition happened to be true in-
tuitive beliefs, it would remain that in lack of any supplementary mean to
assess the truth of a mathematical proposition, we are bound to rely on
psychological facts only. The causal link does not cancel psychologism.
Thus Platonism provides no clue on the processes through which we
assert the truth and the falsity of mathematical propositions.
Any purely psychological account of reasoning leads to psychologism,
and psychologism downplays the normative nature of reasoning. This led
some philosophers such as Davidson to urge for modesty: norms cannot
be explained away in a naturalistic framework. As a consequence, Math-
ematical practice cannot be reduced to its causal antecedents. With
this in mind, Engel (1989) attempts to provide a descriptive theory that
would grasp human rationality. The research program consists of ﬁnding
the laws that a person would ideally follow; it assumes that people are
rational and it prescribes to abstract this rationality. Engel compares
this abstraction with the abstractions made in physics (e.g., a system
is assumed closed) or in economics (e.g., with the homo-economicus).
The abstraction here is made on the empirical limitation weighting on
reasoning. The idealisation is therefore not an empirical generalisation.
What is taken into consideration is the intuition we have of the validity
of arguments. In that way it strongly calls on common sense. What is to
be built eventually is a logic that suits as well as possible our intuitions
of validity. There could be two strategies for building this logic [Engel
1989, 397]. The ﬁrst one is to gather our particular intuitions of validity
and from this build a system of logic that accounts for those intuitions.
The second one, which seems more feasible, is to start from an already
existing logic (e.g., ﬁrst order classical logic) and adjust it to our in-
tuitions by making some corrections, possibly loosening the requisites
for validity. An obvious adjustment, for instance, when starting with
ﬁrst order logic is the one required for the connector ‘if. . . then’ which is
notorious for giving some counterintuitive results [Engel 1989, 44]. The
idealisation can be either maximal, that is to say that we suppose a
strong rationality and build a strongly normative logic, or minimal, that
is to say that our requisites in the consistency are loosened in order to ac-
count for more rational actions. The ﬁrst choice answers to the demand
that logic be normative and guide precisely our reasoning, the second
choice answers to the demand that logic be applicable and correspond
to people’s actual rationality. The maximal idealisation would account
only for what a completely and perfectly rational person would do. But
it is not realist to ascribe such rationality to people. On the other hand,
one wants to avoid the danger of just giving a description of how people
generally act, and thus failing to account for rationality. Consequently,
Engel advises to adopt the principle of thoughtful equilibrium between
the empirical and normative constraints. This shall take into account
both rationality and the restrictions set by cognitive aptitudes. The
logic accordingly constructed shall give rules as close as possible to our
actual reasoning. It would give an “empirical theory of deductive compe-
tence” [Engel 1989, 392]. The logical system thus discovered is justiﬁed
empirically by judgements of acceptability on particular inferences, but
its propositions are justiﬁed by the system, as in any formal logic. We
still deal with a deductive logic and we cannot be accused of justifying
inferences with psychological facts.
The ﬁrst striking point is the similarity between Macnamara’s and
Engel’s research programs. They both want to account for natural rea-
soning on the ground of a logical construction and the research programs
consist in discovering the appropriate logic, which shall be in accord to
our logical intuitions. The logical incompetence of actors is attributed
to performance factors such as the memory space and the ambiguous
interpretations of data. So the diﬀerence between the two projects may
be the status which is given to the logic accordingly constructed. Mac-
namara asserts the existence of this logic in our mind in the form of
mental devices. Engel is much more careful on this point. He must
face the following dilemma: either he gives a causal status to the em-
pirical theory of deductive competence and then he commits the ‘sin’
of psychologism; or he does not give this causal status and then we do
not see what the explanatory power of the theory is. Engel has a well-
balanced discourse with regard to the psychological reality of a system
of logic, once characterising it as respectable, though improbable, empir-
ical hypothesis [Engel 1989, 413], and elsewhere stigmatising it as being
an “illusion descriptive” [Engel 1989, 393]. His stance tends to be neu-
tral with regard to the constitution of the mind. Yet, Engel assumes
that, notwithstanding this neutrality, his research program is relevant
to psychology. Why is that so? If the relevance is not in establishing
some causal laws describing our mental processes in reasoning, where
does it stem from? How does this logic contribute to the psychology
of reasoning? As a matter of fact, Engel cannot attain the “thought-
ful equilibrium” he is aiming at. While the content of his logic can be
a compromise between ‘strongly normative’ and ‘descriptive of people’s
actual behaviour’, the status of the resulting logic cannot. It is either
the logic of the psychologist, and then one should assume that it is a
description of some thought process, or the logic of the logician, and
then it is purely normative. The dilemma strikes once more: it seems
impossible to describe mathematical cognitive abilities without falling
into psychologism.
The strategy I advocate is a way out of this dilemma: humans obvi-
ously have the ability to do mathematics, yet this ability cannot explain
the normative component of mathematical knowledge. As naturalists,
the obvious move for continuing our investigations is to come back to
the empirical data. What is this mysterious normative component that
forbids us to describe cognitive processes as the cause of mathemati-
cal knowledge? Well. . . normative behaviour consists in assessing each
other’s work. It is ﬁrst and foremost a social phenomenon.
4 The cognitive and the social
Here are a few of the social events that make up Mathematics: Math-
ematics is taught at school; this teaching creates a community of math-
ematicians; mathematicians submit their work to journals and editors,
they communicate their results in the hope that their work be recog-
nised as mathematics. The social application of norms is at work in
all those events: a pupil is congratulated for his work, an article is ac-
cepted or not, a work is qualiﬁed as good or erroneous. Mathematics is
made of assertions, and choosing which assertions can enter the corpus
of Mathematics is a collective decision. It is decided by the community
of Mathematicians. Among the inﬁnite set of assertions, mathematicians
choose, collectively, which are true, which are nonsensical, which do not
worth considering, which can gain the status of proof, deﬁnition, axiom
or theorem. For instance, a theorem is actually discovered only when
it has been recognised as such by the community of Mathematicians.
Mathematical knowledge is not the product of solitary mental devices.
Social interactions are essentially constitutive of it. As a consequence,
one must rejects assertion (2) ‘Thus Mathematics is the product of men-
tal devices’ that lead us to psychologism. Even if producing Mathematics
obviously requires using our mental devices, the constitution of mathe-
matical knowledge involve something more for constituting norms, viz.
social interactions.
Psychologism is the counterpart of a simplistic understanding of
mathematical production which corresponds to Figure 1.
Mental processes Mathematics
Figure 1: The simplistic picture
Admittedly, the historical version of this picture is slightly more com-
plex as can be seen from Figure 2.
The confusion, I believe, lies on what it means for a psychological
module to produce knowledge. Knowledge is not the output of some
module, but the output of some modules leads to a behavior that al-
Corpus of mathematical
knowledge
input output Piece of work in
mathematics
Mental
processes
Added to the corpus of mathematical knowledge
Figure 2: The incremental picture.
lows, in certain conditions, the production of a speciﬁc knowledge. For
instance the behavior of good pupils in math class is made possible by
their cognitive abilities. If it was impossible to teach any mathematics to
anybody, then it is likely that mathematics would not exist at all. The
fact that mathematics is actually learned is a psychological fact. But
the teaching itself is a sociological fact. Likewise, the fact that math-
ematicians do produce theorems is a psychological fact. But the fact
that their productions are labelled (or not) theorems, id est recognized
as mathematical productions by the community, is a sociological fact.
The automatic application of a technique, or the blind rule following of
the individual, itself does not furnish a criterion of correct procedure, it
just allows the procedure to be. This dictates a more complex picture
than the above, which aims to take into account the social factors:
Just a more complex picture is shown in Figure 3.
Added to the corpus of mathematical knowledge, the work perdures, is 
communicated and thought. It acquires a normative content.
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Figure 3: A more complex picture.
In this picture, the blue prints indicate the social events. It is these
events that constitute the normative nature of mathematics.
Unfortunately, these social processes, although their existence is ac-
knowledged, are not given their real importance. The opponent of the
sociology of scientiﬁc knowledge would argue that whether recognised or
not by the community mathematics is done by individuals, it is the pro-
duce of their minds. Social interactions, he would go on, have no causal
action on the content of Mathematics. At most, cultural components
may push mathematicians in one direction or another. Thus, the more
complex picture says nothing more than the simplistic ones.
I believe such a view can lead to a genuine research program. It
is not, however, a question that can be settled a priori: these events
are real, they are constitutive of mathematical practice, they are the
manifestations of the normative nature of Mathematics. Mathematics
is de facto a collective, historical production. Thus the psychological
reductionist program bears the onus of proof. The point is that there
cannot be a straightforward reduction of the production of mathematics
to cognitive abilities (simplistic and incremental pictures). Yet, it is still
open whether a more complex and ﬁne-grained reduction is possible. A
reductionist psychological program has to show that the social events of
the more complex picture can be explained in terms of cognitive abilities
only. Historical and social contingencies have no real causal power on
the content and development of Mathematics. Such a program is noble
enough, and quite ambitious. It would greatly gain, however, if it would
take the challenge set by the sociology of scientiﬁc knowledge seriously.
In fact, the scientiﬁc challenge, both empirical and theoretical, is huge.
Let me point out at some of the diﬃculties that a reductionist pro-
gram would have to face:
(1) One of the fundamental assertions of sociologism is that any con-
cept or proof procedure is under-determined by its past applications or
use [Bloor, 1991, 1997]. Deﬁnitions, which are so central to mathemat-
ics, are no exception. They are nothing but single speciﬁc uses of the
concepts deﬁned that do indeed strongly constrain future applications
but cannot wholly determine them. (Think of Lakatos’ (1976) descrip-
tion of the making of mathematics and note that we can never know
whether one will not appear with some kind of monster polyhedra or
any other sort of problem. The way the problem will be solved will de-
pend on the decision of the community). Hence, while Mathematics is
highly constrained by cognitive abilities, it remains under-determined.
Contingent, historical, social determinations come to ﬁll the gap. The
sociology of knowledge thus aims to point out the causal role of these
social determinations on the content of Mathematics. A reductionist
account should not simply deny these causal roles. It should on the con-
trary try to show that social behaviour and collective decisions are, in
turn, wholly determined by our cognitive apparatus. For instance the
thesis that the “cultural creation of the real number was a platonistic re-
discovery of the underlying non-verbal system of arithmetic reasoning”
[Gallistel et al. 2002] should be confronted to historical events: Were
the 18th century developments toward the concept of limit determined
by our sole cognitive abilities [Heintz 2002]? What is then the signiﬁ-
cance of Non-Standard Analysis [Lakatos 1978]? It seems that even at
the most basic levels some decisions are to be taken [Bloor 1994]; these
decisions are taken collectively, by socially situated mathematicians.
(2) The second diﬃculty for the reductionist program lies, as I already
pointed out, in the normative nature of mathematical practice. Only
collective performance can create norms for good or bad, true or false,
and only collective performance can make mathematics, since such norms
are essential to it. The standards through which individual production
is collectively judged is not the ideal, unconstrained, performance of
cognitive abilities. Showing that social norms are wholly determined
by our cognitive apparatus seems diﬃcult. In particular, it remains to
discover the processes through which semantic properties of cognitive
processes are implemented, so to speak, in social norms (see e.g., D.
Sperber (1996) for an analysis of the relations between cultural artefacts,
such as norms, and our cognitive apparatus)
5 Conclusion
There is a belief that prevents the social study of mathematics: it
consists in assimilating the collective production to the individual pro-
duction, the former being thought as being nothing more than the sum of
the latter. This mistaken assimilation is the assumption that transforms
sound cognitivism into psychologism. A proof is thought to be nothing
but the correct use of our logical competence, and Logic itself is thought
as the very result of our ideal performing of the logical competence. The
truths of logic are based on and depends on psychological facts, they are
a pure expression of mental phenomena. Yet, if mathematics is deﬁned
as the mere product of individual mental processes, then mathematics is
psychological facts. These theses, of course, have been strongly criticized
by Husserl and Frege, who call upon the fact that mathematical truths
are objective rather than subjective, and cannot be reduced to the empir-
ical facts studied by psychology. I have argued that the best alternative
theory to psychologism is a kind cognitively informed sociologism.
There is an obvious tension between psychological and sociological
theories of Mathematics. This is understandable since each discipline
is challenging the other. Sociologists point out the historical and social
contingencies at work in the making of mathematics and thus render psy-
chological reduction diﬃcult. Conversely, Psychologists bring up empiri-
cal evidences of the cognitive determinations that make mathematicians
think the way they do. This lessens the relevance and causal power of
historical and social contingencies. Yet these diﬃculties, far from being
reasons to sulk (to say the least) one another, are challenges that could
be fruitfully taken.
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